
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Japan each year for two months of study and home stays. The similar program called the Japan Prefecture Program, which is a year old, brings 47 Japanese students each year to this country for one year of studies and home stays. Both programs are administered by Washington-based Youth for Understanding, an organization I have come to respect and admire.

Learning is a lifetime endeavor, and I promise you that Mitsuko and I will continue to be ardent students of America and Japanese-American relations. We are deeply grateful to all of you, as individuals and as an organization, for all you have done to make our stay here useful, rewarding and enjoyable. We are very happy to return to Japan with such fond memories of Washington and the whole 50 states of this country. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts, and we look forward to seeing you in Tokyo or in our travels.

Sayonara.

BUDGET CUTS POSE PROBLEM MASSACHUSETTS' FOR DENTS

### HON. JOE MOAKLEY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, March 26, 1985

 Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, certainly, one of the most damaging areas of budgetary cutbacks and programmatic restrictions proposed by President Reagan in his fiscal year 1986 budget is in the area of Federal student financial assistance, particularly with regard to the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. I would like to share with my colleagues the following letter from my good friend Joseph M. Cronin, president of the Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corp., about the devastating impact that these changes will have on students attending Massachusetts' independent colleges and universities. While I knew these cutbacks would be quite serious, even I was surprised at the enormous negative ramifications that will result in these postsecondary institutions. I hope that my colleagues in the Congress will realize the shortsightedness of such funding cuts and will join me in opposing the administration's proposal:

MASSACHUSETTS HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORP.

Boston, MA, March 19, 1985. Hon. John Joseph Moakley,

U.S. House of Representatives, Cannon Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MOAKLEY: The Reagan Administration has proposed substantial reductions in student eligibility for a higher education loan. His budget proposal will eliminate 40,000 Massachusetts students from eligibility in order to save \$98 million.

I thought you would like to see the effect on Massachusetts students at the larger independent Massachusetts colleges and universities. The impact on U. Mass.-Amherst is more than six million dollars, but the great burden of costs will be felt by those at private colleges.

The biggest surprise may be the impact on Northeastern University. Although 80 percent of their students earn a portion of their tuition through cooperative education tuition, textbooks, room and board.

School	Loans 1	Amount
Northeastern University.	2.140	\$5,353,17
Boston College	1.452	3,793,89
Boston University	1.251	3,711,18
tarvard College	1,056	3,467.54
Sentley College	837	2,001.93
Suffolk University	756	2,125,17
Ventworth College	599	1.410.51
offege of the Holy Cross	468	1.110.35
Aernmack College	439	999.07
tonehill College	. 433	991.34
offe University	418	1.080,51
ufts University	406	894.48
Marketa Many Contract College	367	922.56
Vestern New England College	362	843.87
ssumption College	339	873.66
labson College		
HASSACHUSERTS INSTITUTE OF FOCHHOLOGY	332	896,34
randeis University	281	674,54
immons College	262	648,50
lark University	243	563,35
pringfield College	207	501.10
pringfield College	191	421,56
	190	492,07
fount Holyoke College	186	439,97
eris Conere	182	414.17
Theaton College	176	403,65
ichols College	174	407.07
Vellesiey College	155	356.31
Filhams College	140	328.59
mmanual Callana	139	299,54
mmanuel College	131	303.51
antral Man Engined College	131	297.76
entral New England College	127	309.18
ollege of Our Lady of the Elms		
urry College	125	288,60
esley College	122	329.11
nna Maria College	105	259,54
mherst College of Music	104	210,51
lerkelee College of Music	103	243,92
ordon College	95	221,97
lassachusetts College of Pharmacy	89	215,85
ordon College lassachusetts College of Pharmacy astern Nazarene College	54	125,06
Pheelock College	48	116.55

<sup>1</sup> To students from families with adjusted gross income of more than \$32,500.

Again, these figures are for Massachusetts students only; 85 percent of Amherst College students have parents living in other states. MIT imports from other states 90 percent of its students, 75 percent of whom stay in Massachusetts and add to our famous high tech prosperity.

The most interesting fact is that 70 percent of our student loan recipients are from families with less than \$32,500 adjusted gross income. But many of these will be ineligible for loans because of the arbitrary \$4,000 cap on all sources of federal aid: Pell grants, work study, and loans. The Guaranteed Student Loan Program serves mainly low income and working class families and middle income families with two or three in college at once.

We appreciate your continued support of this program.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. CRONIN, President.

H.R. 1082 WILL IMPROVE U.S. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPA-BY FACILITATING BILITIES FOR CITIZENSHIP CERTAIN SOURCES

## HON. BOB STUMP

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, March 26, 1985

• Mr. STUMP, Mr. Speaker, the ability of the United States to collect intelligence on the intentions of hostile foreign countries depends upon the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to persuade highly placed individuals in those countries to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. The motivation for such cooperation may vary from individual to individual, However, in-

jobs, many must borrow the rest to pay for telligence sources motivated by the belief in the principles of human free dom, justice, and peace, for which the United States stands in the work have often proved to be of the greater intelligence value. These individual cooperate with U.S. intelligence be cause they wish to contribute to the advancement of high principles of freedom and often because they hope. at the end of their U.S. intelligence service abroad, to be welcomed into the community of freedom we enjoy in the United States. Title VII of H.R. 1082 will enhance the ability of U.S. intelligence to secure the cooperation of these well-motivated, highly placed individuals abroad by permitting them, in certain circumstances, to become U.S. citizens expeditiously at the end of their intelligence service.

#### 1. UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

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To carry out its foreign intelligence collection mission, the Central Intelligence Agency depends upon human sources abroad for information and operational assistance. To secure the cooperation of a well-placed individual who can provide the needed information or assistance, the CIA officer who will work with that source must establish with him a secret relationship with three critical elements: secrecy. trust, and mutual benefit.

Secrecy is the first critical element in the relationship between the CIA and a foreign intelligence source. A potential source will cooperate with the CIA only if he believes that the secrecy of his relationship with the CIA will be protected. If he believes that the CIA cannot provide an ironclad guarantee of secrecy and deliver on that guarantee, he will not cooperate. If such secrecy is breached, the source loses his freedom, and in many parts of the world, his life. The Congress has in recent years enhanced considerably the ability of the CIA to deliver on its guarantee of secrecy in human intelligence activities by enacting the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which protects the identities of intelligence sources, and the CIA Information Act, which excludes CIA operational files from the reach of the Freedom of Information Act.

Trust is the second critical element in the relationship between the CIA and an intelligence source. The intelligence source must be confident that the CIA as an institution of the U.S. Government, and the particular CIA officers with whom he works, will deal with him honestly and fairly, will take care of his interests in the event of mishap, and will honor fully whatever promises are made to him. The CIA takes great care to maintain such trust. Breaches of this trust would alienate foreign intelligence sources, ending their cooperation with U.S. intelligence.

Mutual benefit is the third critical element in the relationship between the CIA and the intelligence source.

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Neither U.S. Intelligence nor an intellisence source will incur the risk which inheres in a clandestine intelligence relationship unless the product of the relationship is judged by both parties to be worth the risk. The U.S. Government benefits from the secret information and operational assistance the intelligence source provides. The intelligence source's benefits vary, sometimes including compensation and sometimes not. Among the most dedicated sources, however, are those who only effective intelligence want a chance to contribute to the advancement of justice and freedom for which the United States stands and a chance to go to the United States at the end of their intelligence service, to participate in the free society which their secret service has helped to maintain. 2. Admission of intelligence sources to the

UNITED STATES AT THE END OF THEIR SERVICE Under section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403h), whenever the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration determine that entry of an alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, the alien is admitted to the United States for permanent residence without regard to U.S. immigration laws. No more than 100 persons may be admitted under this special authority in any fiscal year. This special provision, enacted 36 years ago, provided clear authority to bring U.S. foreign intelligence sources into the United States for permanent residence at the end of their intelligence service. Without such a clear statute that applies notwithstanding any other laws, the CIA would be unable to promise a potential intelligence source that at the end of his secret intelligence service the United States will reward him and protect him with permanent U.S. resi-

The ability of the CIA—with the approval of the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration—to offer permanent residence in the United States at the end of service contributes substantially to the CIA's ability to persuade highly-placed indi-Miduals abroad to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. A statute which would permit U.S. intelligence to offer to a by potential intelligence source U.S. potential intermediate state of his service Build contribute further to the CIA's bility to persuade key personnel of tile foreign governments to cooperwith U.S. intelligence. MABILITY TO OFFER CITIZENSHIP TO INTEL-

GENERAL THE END OF THEIR SERV-Athough section 7 of the CIA Act

ides extraordinary authority to it foreign intelligence sources to United States for permanent resi-Be similar statute exists which eins extraordinary authority with

respect to citizenship for such persons. Thus, U.S. intelligence cannot offer citizenship to the best potential sources, because no statute exists which provides a clear guarantee that the United States can deliver on that offer after the source performs his secret intelligence service. Regardless of the value to the United States of a source's secret intelligence service, to become a citizen after he has become a permanent U.S. resident, he must qualify under the generally applicable naturalization laws. The requirement to comply with the general naturalization laws falls to take account of the critical contribution of certain intelligence sources to the national security and also falls to take account that, in certain cases, a former intelligence source may be handicapped in qualifying for citizenship solely because of his intelligence service.

Well-placed individuals of good character in hostile countries who risk their lives and livelihood for years to provide vital intelligence to the United States, because they believe in the principles for which America stands, have proved their fitness for citizenship by that service. Risking one's life and livelihood to assist a nation because of its principles represents the highest demonstration of allegiance to that nation. A foreign intelligence source whose actions contribute substantially to the security of the United States merits special consideration for citizenship.

The citizenship laws of our ally to the north, Canada, provide a clear example of a national determination that certain service of extraordinary value may merit an expedited method for conferring citizenship on the individual performing the service. Thus, section 5(4) of Canada's Citizenship Act (1976), other provisions of which contain detailed and restrictive provisions for becoming a citizen, provides:

In order . . . to reward services of an exceptional value to Canada, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Governor in Council may, in his discretion, direct the Minister to grant citizenship to any person and, where such a direction is made, the Minister shall forthwith grant citizenship to the person named in the direction.

The Canadian statute provides a useful model for special citizenship consideration based on extraordinarily valuable service to the Nation.

In the absence of a provision for special consideration for U.S. citizenship of America's best intelligence sources, they must continue to qualify for citizenship under the general naturalization laws. In some cases, however, the very activity the source undertook to assist U.S. intelligence may place the source at a disadvantage in qualifying for citizenship. Thus, for example, a source who at the urging of U.S. intelligence—remained member of the Communist Party of a foreign nation to report to U.S. intelligence on the party's activities, suffers due to his cooperation with U.S. intel-

ligence when he comes to the U States at the end of his service. time spent in service to the Un States as an intelligence source. not count in the source's favor in s lying certain waiting periods impo by the general naturalization is Having been a member of a Com nist Party, he must wait 10 ye before becoming eligible for citiz ship, since the section 313 of the 1 migration and Nationality Act U.S.C. 1424) requires that 10 year have elapsed since an individual see ing citizenship has terminated mei bership in a Communist Party. The under current U.S. law, foreign intel gence sources who have contribute substantially to U.S. security not onl receive no special treatment in th citizenship process, but may even b actively handicapped in that proces because of their service.

In addition to the substantive handicaps which the Immigration and Nationality Act imposes upon intelligence sources seeking citizenship, that act imposes procedural handicaps as well. Section 316(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1427) requires that an individual seeking citizenship file a petition for naturalization in the court with jurisdiction over his place of residence. This requirement would result in a publicly available court record revealing that the source is in the United States and revealing where he has settled in the United States. The availability of such information could constitute a threat to the safety of the source, whose former country may seek to do him

In some situations, such as that of Soviet MIG pilot Viktor Belenko, the executive branch has secured the citizenship consideration a source deserves by seeking a private bill in the Congress. The private bill procedure, however, lacks sufficient security to serve as a permanent solution to the problem of citizenship for key sources. The private bill procedure reveals that a source is in the United States, since the private bill must include the source's name. Moreover, the private bill procedure requires rather general dissemination in the legislative branch of information, much of which will be chassified, concerning the merits of the private bill. Most importantly, the outcome of the private bill procedure is not predictable; the press of other legislative business or the timing of the bill may result in its failure to pass for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of the private bill. The hit-or-miss nature of the private bill procedure prevents U.S. intelligence from offering the prospect of citizenship to attract key foreign sources to service for the United States, because U.S. intelligence cannot offer citizenship unless it is absolutely sure it can deliver on its offer, and it cannot be sure with the

Existing U.S. naturalization statutes do not take proper account of the special situation of the most valuable U.S. foreign intelligence sources. Legislation clearly establishing a speedy, secure, and reliable procedure for citizenship for such sources would correct this deficiency, enabling U.S. intelligence in appropriate circumstances to offer citizenship to key potential intelligence sources to attract them to service for the United States and to reward those sources who have contributed substantially to the security of the United States.

> 4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE IMPROVEMENT ACT

Title VII of H.R. 1082, entitled the "Foreign Intelligence Source Improvement Act," provides the speedy. secure, and reliable procedure for citizenship for key sources that U.S. intelligence needs. Section 702 in title VII of the bill would permit the President personally, in certain circumstances, to naturalize intelligence sources admitted to permanent U.S. residence under section 7 of the CIA Act of 1949. Section 702 provides:

SEC. 702. Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403h) is amended by inserting "(a)" after "SEC. 7." and adding at the end thereof the following new subsection-

"(b)(1) The President may, notwithstanding any other law, naturalize as a citizen of the United States an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence pursuant to subsection (a) of this section if-

"(A) the Attorney General determines and certifies to the President that the alien is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States, and

"(B) the President finds that the foreign intelligence activities of the alien on behalf of the United States have contributed substantially to the security of the United States,

except that in no case shall the number of aliens naturalized in any fiscal year pursuant to this subsection exceed five.

"(2) Prior to naturalization under paragraph (1) of this subsection, an alien to be naturalized under such paragraph shall, before an officer of the executive branch designated for the purpose by the President, take the oath of renunciation of former citizenship and acceptance of allegiance to the United States required of an alien naturalized under other provisions of law.

"(3) Nothwithstanding any other law, a district court of the United States, upon application of the Attorney General under this subsection, shall, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources, methods and activities, issue or cause to be issued such documents relating to an alien naturalized by the President under this subsection as are issued relating to an alien naturalized under other provisions of law, and such documents relating to an alien naturalized by the President shall have the same legal effect as documents issued relating to an alien naturalized under other provisions of law.

"(4) The President may not delegate the authority granted in paragraph (1) of this subsection, anything in section 301 of title 3, United States Code, to the contrary notwithstanding.

"(5) The President shall notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate each time the authority granted in paragraph (1) of this subsection is exercised.

Section 702 of H.R. 1082 provides for naturalization of an intelligence source admitted to permanent U.S. residence under the CIA Act if, first, the Attorney General determines that the source is of good character and. second, the President finds that the source's foreign intelligence activities contributed substantially to the security of the United States. To ensure application of the provision in the manner intended, section 702 carefully circumscribes the unusual authority it confers to naturalize individuals whose intelligence activities have made an extraordinary contribution to U.S. security. Thus, the individual to be naturalized must, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, meet the good character requirement applicable to candidates for naturalization under other laws (see 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3)); the President personally must evaluate the individual's intelligence activity and find that it constitutes a substantial contribution to U.S. security; the President personally must exercise the naturalization authority and may do so only with respect to not more than five individuals per fiscal year; and the President must notify the intelligence committees of the Congress each time he uses the authority.

Section 702 provides a clear and reliable statutory procedure for naturalization of individuals whose valuable secret intelligence service for the United States merits citizenship. The reliability of the procedure will enable U.S. intelligence to offer citizenship in appropriate circumstances to key potential intelligence sources. Enactment of section 702 will enhance the ability of the CIA to collect critically needed foreign intelligence and will properly reward with citizenship the Nation's most highly valuable, deserving intelligence sources.

## UNDERSTANDING AIMS OF IRISH NATIONALISM

# HON. JOSEPH J. DioGUARDI

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 26, 1985

 Mr. DioGUARDI. Mr. Speaker, on. March 17, Saint Patrick's Day, 1982, an Taoiseach-Irish prime minister-Charles Haughey delivered an important message at the White House at the invitation of President Ronald Reagan. At that time, Mr. Haughey, like Tomas O Fiaich, the Archibishop of Armagh and Cardinal Primate of All Ireland, recognized both the historical and the practical validity of an American dimension to Irish affairs. Mr. Haughey also encouraged positive American involvement in the quest for

This month, now as the leader of opposition, Fianna Fail, party in D Eireann, Mr. Haughey returned to t United States to resume his call American support for the cause Irish reunification, which is the qua non of peace with justice. He that the noble principles that inspire the Founding Fathers of this great Nation be applied to Ireland.

In a major address to the Friends Fianna Fail in America in New York on Friday, March 1, 1985, Charles Haughey dealt plainly with the confused, often negative signals which have emanated from Dublin and issued a call for constructive dialog and cooperation. He also spoke plainly about the situation in Northeast Ireland where there is no democratic government and the six-county area can only be governed by force and the constant deployment on the streets of fully armed troops and police.

Last month British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told this Congress that our collective traditions and common heritage included:

Representative government, corpus, trial by jury, a system of constitu-tional checks and balances • • • religious toleration.

She reminded us that:

In the practice of politics-and in our civilization generally—the conscious inspiration of it all has been the belief and practice of freedom under law, a freedom disciplined by morality, under a law perceived to be just.

Charles Haughey came to America this month to remind us that none of those noble principles are put into practice in those six of the divided Irish Province of Ulster's nine counties known as Northern Ireland. He also seeks to enhance our understanding of the legitimate aims of Irish nationalism and of the Irish fundamental, permanent aspiration for sovereign independence which rises Phoenix-like in each generation.

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I agree with Mr. Haughey that:

The time has surely come for America to use her great power and influence tohelp—solve one of the major political problems of the West and to eliminate a source of tension and trouble between two nations with whom she has the closest historical ties of friendship.

As I have often said, America's debt to the Irish in no less than the debt she redeemed in France in 1918 and again in 1944.

For the purpose of constructive dialog, I offer, for consideration in the record of this Congress, this address by: Charles J. Haughey, T.D., president of Fianna Fail, on the occasion of the first annual dinner of the friends of Fianna Fail in America, New York, March 1, 1985.

Address by Charles J. Haughey T.D. PRESIDENT OF FIANNA FAIL

Our dinner this evening is presided over by one of the greatest and finest Irish-Americans of any era, Thomas W. Gleason. At the age of fifteen Teddy Gleason went

down to work on the docks of New York for a just and lasting peace for all Ireland. , 10 cents an hour and rose to become Presi-

